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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF STATE UI SYSTEMS
Abstract
Comparisons among state unemployment insurance (UI) systems can be misleading.
Frequently quoted indicators of benefit generosity, tax cost, and adherence to the
experience-rating principle are influenced by the relative economic conditions of states.  Such
comparisons thereby obscure underlying structural differences in state UI systems.  A business
considering alternative states in which to locate a production facility should be cautious when
interpreting UI information in an economic developer’s marketing pitch.  This paper offers
alternative indicators based on how representative firms, with a well specified unemployment
experience, would fare in different states. 
The authors use a micro-simulation approach to model the experiences of representative
workers and firms to compare 28 states and contrast the results with those obtained from more
conventional indicators.  In closing, the authors consider whether a business location decision
would be influenced differently by the alternative measures of state UI systems.   
1We are citing numbers for Calendar Year 1998 because the micro-simulations reported in Section 2 are
based on 1998 UI provisions.  Latest available data (1999:2) reveal similar competitive rankings for the New
England states, although the tax burdens of Connecticut and Massachusetts have declined markedly in both
absolute and relative terms.  See Appendix Table 1.
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF STATE UI SYSTEMS
Christopher J. O’Leary, Robert Tannenwald, Wei-Jang Huang, and Pei Zhu
Imagine the following scenario.  Economic development officials in Massachusetts are
close to signing a deal with a large (fictitious) Midwest-based financial service firm that will create
an estimated 5,000 new jobs in the Bay State.  Negotiations hit a last-minute snag when officials
from North Carolina, also competing for the employer, caution the firm’s negotiating team that
Massachusetts’ unemployment insurance (UI) tax burden is high.  As evidence, they point out that
UI tax collections per employee are 275 percent higher than in North Carolina, while the ratio of
UI tax collections to wages paid to covered employees is 167 percent higher (Table 1). 
Continuing with their pitch, the North Carolinians note that, even though their state’s tax burden
is lower, their UI benefits are slightly more generous.  On average, North Carolina replaces a
larger fraction of the lost wages of the unemployed than Massachusetts does (Table 2).  As a
counterattack, Massachusetts’ recruiters consider citing North Carolina’s low Experience Rating
Index (ERI) in order to stir fears that the firm would have to heavily subsidize cyclically sensitive
firms, especially construction companies, during and after recessions.  Trouble is, Massachusetts’
ERI is pretty low, too.
Is Massachusetts as undesirable in UI tax-cost terms as North Carolina’s contingent makes
it out to be?  Could the Commonwealth’s recruiters cite alternative indicators that would cast the
state’s UI system in a more favorable light?  This paper argues that inter-regional differences in
economic conditions bias traditional indicators, thereby obscuring underlying structural
differences.  It presents alternative indicators, based on a micro-simulation approach, which are
subject to fewer biases.
1. Traditional UI Measures
1.1 Measuring UI Tax Competitiveness
Those concerned about the competitiveness of New England’s states in attracting new
employers lament that, except for New Hampshire, all the states collect relatively high UI taxes. 
These taxes appear to be high whether measured in terms of dollars per UI-covered employee or
per $1,000 of wages paid to UI-covered workers.  In 1998, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island ranked among the top 15 according to both measures.  Connecticut and Vermont also had
UI tax burdens that were well above the national median (Table 1).1
However, states’ rankings according to these two indicators are strongly affected by the
relative strength of their labor markets.  Given that all states practice experience rating, the
rankings in Table 1 depend in part on prior rates of insured unemployment (IUR).  Consider, for
2
2It does not necessarily follow that the average wage received by unemployed workers prior to losing their
jobs is higher than that received by those who remain employed.  In fact, several studies have found that the
opposite is true (see Vroman 1980 and Advisory Council on Unemployment Insurance 1995).  The cyclicality of
the benefit-wage ratio reflects a narrowing of the gap between the prior wages of the unemployed and the wages of
the employed during economic contractions.  As a result, the average weekly benefit rises relative to the average
weekly wage.
Evidence that the average wage of unemployed workers prior to being laid off is lower than that of
workers who remain employed has led some economists to argue that the benefit-wage ratio, apart from its cyclical
biases, is an invalid measure of benefit generosity.  A more appropriate measure, not currently reported by the U.S.
Department of Labor, would be the ratio of the average benefit to the average wage earned by the unemployed
before losing their job (see O’Leary and Rubin, 1997, pp. 172-76, and Advisory Council on Unemployment
Insurance 1995, pp. 21, 126, 138).
example, the relationship between IUR and UI taxes as a percentage of wages paid to covered
workers.  A sharp spike in IUR usually pushes employers into higher UI tax brackets, where they
remain for several years.  If tax rates rise faster than taxable payrolls, or if taxable payrolls decline,
then the ratio of UI tax contributions to wages will rise.  As a result, an increase in a state’s UI
tax-to-wage ratio relative to those of competing states may reflect a temporary deterioration in its
relative economic strength rather than in its long-run competitive standing.
The direct relationship between insured unemployment and UI tax burdens can be seen in
Figure 1 and in the six panels of Figure 2.  Note in Figure 2 that in 1989, at the end of a long
regional economic boom, two New England states (Connecticut and Massachusetts) posted their
lowest IUR since the 1950s.  For 1989, their UI tax burdens ranked 43rd and 34th, respectively
(U.S. Department of Labor 1993).  After a recession began in the early 1990s, layoffs increased
and tax rates rose due to experience rating.  By 1994, the average UI tax burdens of employers in
Connecticut and Massachusetts were respectively the tenth and third highest in the nation (U.S.
Department of Labor, UI Data Summary).  These increases in relative UI tax burdens were
caused largely by cyclical rather than structural influences.  
1.2 Measuring UI Benefit Generosity
A commonly used measure of UI benefit generosity is the benefit-to-wage ratio.  Cyclical
influences also complicate interpretation of this measure.  In general, the average prior wage of
UI benefit recipients is lower than that for currently employed UI-covered workers (Vroman
1980, p. 170).  However, when a state’s economy contracts, the percentage of layoffs occurring
in cyclically sensitive sectors, such as manufacturing and construction, tends to rise.  These
sectors offer higher-than-average wages.  Since a worker’s weekly UI benefit varies with his or
her most recent wage rate (up to a state-specific maximum), a state’s average weekly UI benefit
tends to rise at the beginning of an economic recession.  At the same time, the percentage of
employment accounted for by relatively stable industries, which generally pay wages lower than
either manufacturing or construction, tends to rise.  Furthermore, the demand for labor is weak in
such periods.  Consequently, the average weekly wage of employees tends to increase more
slowly than during times of economic expansion.2  With UI benefit payments increasing and wage
growth slowing, the benefit-wage ratio rises.
3
3According to Topel (1984), this effect is weakened when experience rating is imperfect.  Also, rigid
adherence to the principle can be destabilizing if toward the end of a recession it causes UI taxes on struggling
firms to rise too sharply, inducing them to postpone rehiring or to close their doors.  
The cyclical pattern of the benefit-to-wage ratio for the nation as a whole is evident in
Figure 2.  Cyclical influences are also generally visible in each New England state, especially in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island (Figure 3).  These fluctuations limit generalizations about the
region that can be drawn from interstate comparisons of benefit-to-wage ratios.  For example, in
1982, Massachusetts’ average weekly benefit amount (AWBA) was 36.5 percent of its average
weekly wage (AWW).  This ranked the Bay State’s benefit-to-wage ratio (AWBA/AWW) 38th
among the states.  This relatively low ranking reflected its low insured unemployment rate (ranked
36th) in that year.  In 1990, the Commonwealth’s ratio of 42.5 percent ranked seventh in the
nation, largely because its insured unemployment rate ranked fourth (U.S. Department of Labor
1993).  In 1998, the Commonwealth’s benefit-to-wage ratio ranked 21th (Table 2), about the same
rank as its insured unemployment rate (18th).  If these cyclical influences were to be removed,
would the Commonwealth’s benefits be relatively generous or stingy?  One cannot tell from these
simple comparisons.
1.3 Measuring UI Experience Rating
According to the experience-rating principle, an employer’s UI tax rate should move in
close step with its pattern of worker layoffs.  Adherence to the experience-rating principle
promotes several policy goals.  As discussed in Tannenwald and O’Leary (1997) and Tannenwald,
O’Leary, and Huang (1999), it enhances inter-industry allocative efficiency by equalizing ratios of
UI contributions to benefit payments across industries.  Dissimilar ratios indicate cross-industry
subsidization and, therefore, allocative distortions.  Furthermore, up to a point, employment is
stabilized because firms are discouraged from laying off workers and encouraged to expand their
employment cautiously because they will be penalized if they must eventually issue pink slips
(Brechling and Laurence 1995).3
In order to evaluate the degree to which each state adheres to the experience-rating
principle, the U.S. Department of Labor annually publishes an Experience Rating Index.  The
index equals the percentage of total UI benefits paid by a state that is “effectively charged,” that
is, charged to specific employers for the purpose of determining their experience-rated tax rate. 
Although a large fraction of a firm’s UI tax bill is determined by its experience rating, in most
states UI taxes also include assessments levied on all firms at a uniform rate.  These assessments
cover benefits paid to workers laid off by insolvent firms, benefits charged to firms already paying
the state’s maximum tax rate, benefits whose costs the state feels should be shared by all
employers (such as dependents’ allowances), and supplementary infusions to UI trust funds when
experience-rated taxes fail to replenish them adequately (solvency assessments).  
Like other indicators, states’ experience-rating indices exhibit cyclical variation     (Figure
4).  When a state’s economy contracts, an increasing fraction of employers already at the state’s
maximum tax rate continue to lay off workers, and bankruptcy becomes more widespread.  These
4
4Technical details about UIMSM are given in Hunt, O’Leary, and Huang (1990).
5Each firm is assumed to have a workforce employed over the course of each year, with a certain
percentage not working because of layoffs.  That percentage is the firm’s IUR.
events result in rising UI benefit payments that are either slowly or never recouped from the firms
responsible for them.  UI trust fund reserves are drawn down, triggering solvency assessments
that are rarely imposed in proportion to a firm’s experience rating.  For all these reasons, a state’s
experience rating as measured by the ERI is inversely related to its insured unemployment rate.
Regional differences in economic cycles around the country have caused state ERI
rankings to change dramatically since the index was first reported in 1988 (see Figure 4).  For
example, in 1991, when New England’s economy was relatively weak, Massachusetts’ ERI was
40, the lowest of the 49 states assigned an index value in that year.  Connecticut’s ERI was 47,
ranked 46th.  By 1997 (the latest year for which the index is available), the Commonwealth’s ERI
had climbed to 55 and ranked 28th among 44 reporting states (Table 3).  Connecticut’s ERI, at 66,
ranked 15th of 44 (Table 3).  Was the increase in each state’s ERI attributable to its relatively
rapid decline in unemployment or to policy changes that increased the degree to which the UI tax
systems are experience-rated?  Alternative measures are required to answer this question.  
2. Alternative Measures Based on a Simulation Model
This study uses a “hypothetical firm” approach to specify a new set of UI system
indicators that are not affected by swings in the business cycle.  We do this using the
Unemployment Insurance Micro Simulation Model (UIMSM), which is a computer simulation
model of state UI systems.  UIMSM was originally developed during the 1980s at the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research under the direction of Timothy Hunt.4
2.1 Overview of the Simulation Model
UIMSM is designed to simulate the UI tax liabilities paid by a hypothetical firm and the UI
benefits given to the workers it has laid off.  We use the UIMSM to estimate interstate differences
in UI tax liabilities and benefit levels resulting solely from differences in state UI laws and
regulations.  This is done by holding the firms’ annual wages, insured unemployment rate (IUR),
and other characteristics constant, and by assuming that a recession causes the IUR of firms in all
states to rise by the same amount.5
To permit examination of several diverse issues, we do simulations using six different
hypothetical firm types.  The firms differ in their average annual wages paid, the percentage of
their workforce unemployed during nonrecessionary years (the firm’s initial IUR), and the
response of the firm’s IUR to the onset of a recession (the “spike” in the firm’s IUR). 
The first case (1) is typical of a firm in the services industry.  It is characterized by an average
wage level for 1998 ($28,000), a low initial IUR (1.15 percent), and a small IUR spike (1.15
percentage points).  This example is reasonable for an enterprise like a bank or an insurance
agency.  Three cases (2-4) were styled to represent manufacturers, since state and local
5
6The average hourly wage for production workers of U.S. manufacturers in September 1998 was $13.60,
and their average workweek was 41.6 hours.  $13.60 per hour x 41.6 hours x 50 working weeks in a year equals
$28,288 per year.  Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1998, p. 15.
7The 28 states are identical to those comprising the sample in Hunt, O’Leary, and Huang (1990).  They
were included in that sample because in 1990 they accounted for most of the nation’s manufacturing employment. 
Hunt, O’Leary, and Huang were primarily concerned with the manufacturing sector.
governments vie most intensely for manufacturing jobs.  The national average wage for
manufacturing production workers in 1998 was $28,000.6  Our examples also include a lower
average wage ($16,000) and a higher average wage ($40,000).  Like a typical manufacturer, all
three cases have a low initial IUR (1.15 percent) but a large spike in the IUR (3.45 percentage
points).  The fifth case is a hypothetical firm with a low wage level, moderate initial IUR (2.3
percent), and a moderate spike in IUR (2.3 percentage points); this example resembles a
prototypical retailer.  The sixth case has a high wage, high initial IUR, and a large spike of IUR
(4.6 percentage points); this example fits the profile of a construction firm.  Simulations were
performed for 28 states, two of which are in New England (Connecticut and Massachusetts).7
Most of the interstate differences revealed by the simulations are determined by: (1) the
method for determining an employer’s experience rating, (2) the state taxable wage base, (3) the
range of statutory tax rates applied to this base as determined by a firm’s experience rating, and
(4) solvency assessment rates.
All 28 states use either a “reserve ratio” or “benefit ratio” approach to determine a firm’s
experience rating.  Under the reserve ratio approach, the state keeps track of each firm’s
cumulative UI tax payments (those made since the firm’s creation) and the cumulative benefits
effectively charged to the firm.  Each year, the state divides the difference between the firm’s
cumulative UI tax payments and benefit charges (the balance in the firm’s reserve account) by the
firm’s payroll paid to covered employees.  Using the state UI tax schedule, the reserve ratio
determines the firm’s UI tax rate.  Between state minimum and maximum UI tax rates, the lower
the reserve ratio, the higher the tax rate.
Under the benefit ratio approach, a firm’s experience rating depends solely on the benefits
charged to it relative to its payroll, or benefit ratio, during a specified period (typically three to
five years).  Its history of UI tax payments is irrelevant.  In some benefit ratio states, a firm’s
benefit ratio is the firm’s experience-rated tax rate.  Other benefit ratio states have schedules
stipulating how a firm’s tax rate varies with its benefit ratio.
An important difference between the reserve ratio and benefit ratio approaches is the
speed with which the state recovers the costs of an increase in benefits charged to a firm.  Under
the reserve ratio approach, a firm’s tax liability rises gradually after a surge in charged benefits,
remains at an elevated level for several years, and then falls slowly with improving economic
conditions.  By contrast, under the benefit ratio approach, surges in charged benefits are paid for
relatively rapidly and tax rates fall quickly once costs have been recovered. 
6
8The federal government also gives the states a powerful financial incentive to incorporate the experience-
rating principle into their UI tax regimes.  It imposes its own UI tax on employers, on top of the state tax, equal
nominally to 6 percent of the first $7,000 of annual wages paid to each covered employee.  The federal tax finances
the administrative costs of the whole federal/state UI system and loans to states that have exhausted their own
reserves.  Provided certain conditions are met, the federal government gives a credit against 90 percent of its tax,
leaving an effective federal tax rate of 0.6 percent.  The employer must not be delinquent on its state UI taxes. 
Furthermore, the state in which the employer is located must not have any outstanding debt to the federal
unemployment account, and its UI laws must conform to federal laws.  According to federal law, a state must have
experience-rated UI tax structures for its employers to qualify for the 90 percent credit.  Currently, the federal
government levies an additional 0.2 percentage-point surtax, making the effective federal UI tax rate equal to 0.8
percent.  
9The effect of this one-week wait on an employer’s benefit charges depends on its average duration of
unemployment and its average exhaustion rate (the percentage of its laid-off workers who exhaust the UI benefits
for which they are eligible).  For the simulations reported in this article, a uniform duration of unemployment of
16.1 weeks and a uniform exhaustion rate of 32.3 percent were assumed.  These values equal their actual national
averages in 1998:Q1 (U.S. Department of Labor, UI Data Summary).
These differences are evident in a comparison of two UIMSM simulations, one involving a
firm located in Massachusetts, a reserve ratio state, and the other involving a firm located in
Connecticut, a benefit ratio state (Figure 5).  In both simulations, the firm experiences an
unemployment shock in year 11.  In both states, the firm’s UI tax bill rises slightly in that period
and continues to rise in year 12.  While the tax bill of the Massachusetts firm peaks in year 12, one
year earlier than that of its Connecticut counterpart, the difference between its peak-year tax bill
and its pre-shock tax bill is smaller.  Moreover, this difference does not disappear in the
Massachusetts scenario until year 18.  By contrast, the shock-induced increase in the Connecticut
firm’s tax bill vanishes by year 16.
The federal government imposes few restrictions on state UI tax structures.  State taxable
wage bases must be at least as large as the first $7,000 of each employee’s annual wages.  The
highest tax rate imposed under any experience-rated tax schedule must be at least 5.4 percent.
Otherwise, states have considerable leeway in designing their UI tax systems.8  Consequently, as
shown in Table 4, in 1998 UI tax rate schedules and taxable wage bases differ sharply among
states.  Most states have minimum tax rates greater than 0 in order to get firms with low
propensities to lay off workers to help cover the costs of ineffectively charged benefits.  States
also differ sharply in their solvency assessment rates.  In only 5 of the 28 states—Connecticut,
Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, and Wisconsin—does an employer’s solvency assessments rate
reflect its experience rating; in the other 23, assessments are imposed at a uniform rate.
UIMSM also incorporates state-specific UI features. These include the time lag between the date
on which firms’ tax rates are set and the date on which they become effective, rounding
provisions, lower and upper boundaries on reserve ratios and benefit ratios, and the one-week lag
between the termination of employment and benefit eligibility.9
While UIMSM captures considerable detail, it fails to take into account some important
realities.  It does not incorporate the special tax rate provisions that some states apply to firms in
certain industries or in certain size groups.  Finally, UIMSM does not anticipate how tax rate
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schedules and solvency assessments might change in response to a particular spike in
unemployment.
2.2 Derivation of Alternative Measures
As illustrated in Figure 5 for Connecticut and Massachusetts, the tax liabilities and the
benefits paid were simulated for a 30-year period under each state's UI laws and regulations.  Two
different simulations were performed for each of the six hypothetical firm types.  In the “control
run,” the firm’s IUR remains unchanged throughout the entire period.  In the “spike run,” the firm
confronts an adverse economic shock that causes its IUR to jump in period 11 by its pre-
designated amount, leading to a surge in paid-out benefits.  Benefit payments fall to their “pre-
spike” level in period 12 and stay there for the remainder of the simulation 
To undertake comparisons of state UI tax systems, for each state we computed the
present value of total UI tax liabilities in the spike run over a 30-year simulation period discounted
back to period 11 for each firm type.  A ratio we call the “tax burden” is one measure of interstate
competitiveness.  It uses Massachusetts as a reference state and is computed as







=Massachusetts, the reference state against which others are compared.  x
The numerator in the tax burden is the discounted value of tax payments in a state, and the
denominator is the similar value for Massachusetts.  Values greater or less than one mean
employers in a state have tax burdens greater or less than Massachusetts employers in similar
circumstances.
We also use Massachusetts as the reference to evaluate state UI “benefit generosity.” The
present value of UI compensation paid to workers laid off by firms during the spike simulation run
for each hypothetical firm type in each state is divided by the similar quantity for Massachusetts. 
For a hypothetical firm i, the relative generosity of UI benefits in each state, x, relative to







































where B = UI benefits paid to laid off workers.
To evaluate the allocative neutrality of states’ UI systems, we used the spike run
simulation and divided the present value of each firm’s total UI tax liabilities by the present value
of the total benefits paid to its laid-off workers:
Within a given state, the narrower the dispersion in the “tax-benefit ratio” across the six firm
types, the less the degree of interindustry subsidization and, therefore, the more allocatively
neutral the state’s UI system.
In evaluating the degree to which each state’s UI system adheres to the experience-rating
principle, we estimate the “marginal tax cost” to the firm of an additional benefit dollar. 
Specifically, we compute the present value of the total taxes charged to the firm in the control run
over the entire 30-year period, discounted to year 11.  In a similar fashion, we compute the
present value of the firm’s total taxes in the spike run and the total benefits paid to its laid-off
workers in both runs.  We divide the difference between the present values of the two tax streams
by the difference between the present values of the two benefit streams to arrive at an estimate of
the firm’s marginal tax cost (MTC): 
2.3  Results
For the six hypothetical firms, indicators of tax competitiveness, benefit generosity,
allocative neutrality, and adherence to the experience-rating principle are provided in Tables 5
through 8.
9
11We average each state’s tax burden index over the six simulations and divide this average by its index of
UI taxes per covered employee.  The resulting  ratios are regressed on the states’ average insured unemployment
rate for 1998:Q2, 1998:Q1, and 1997:Q4.  The estimated coefficient on the average unemployment rate is -0.55,
significant at the .001 level.
12Specifically, the simulations assume that half the workers of each employer are single with no
dependents and half are married with two dependents.
13In 1997 the United States had 122.7 million employees.  In that year 84.2 million Americans were
between the ages of 0 and 21.  Many of them were not dependents.  Most dependents fall within this age bracket.  
In 1994 total establishment payroll in the U.S. was 114.1 million, while in that year, the 107.3 million tax filing
units filing for the U.S. personal income tax (86 percent of whom reported wage income) claimed a total of 70.0
Measures of Relative Tax Competitiveness
Simulated UI tax burdens borne by each case firm, indexed to the values for
Massachusetts, are presented and ranked by state in Table 5, columns 1 through 6.  For purposes
of comparison, column 7 presents UI taxes collected per covered employee, also indexed to
Massachusetts.
Each of the first six columns in Table 5 is highly correlated with column 7, suggesting that
the traditional indicator has some validity.  Nevertheless, some states’ ranking in column 7 differs
significantly from their rankings according to the six simulation-based indicators.  These
differences are generally consistent with the hypothesis that, as an indicator of tax
competitiveness, UI taxes per covered worker is cyclically biased.  States whose ranking
according to this traditional indicator is significantly lower than their rankings according to the
simulation-based indicators have experienced relatively low rates of insured unemployment over
the past several quarters.  Examples of such states include Florida, North Carolina, and Texas. 
Conversely, states whose ranking according to UI taxes per worker is noticeably higher than their
rankings according to the indexes produced by the six simulations (for example, California,
Michigan, and New Jersey) have had relatively high rates of insured unemployment in recent
quarters (U.S. Department of Labor, UI Data Summary).11
Measuring Benefit Generosity
Total benefits paid by representative firms in each of the 28 states (indexed to
Massachusetts values) are presented and ranked in Table 6, columns 1 through 6.  For purposes
of comparison, wage replacement ratios (also indexed to Massachusetts’ ratio) are reported and
ranked in column 7.  The wage replacement is positively correlated with each of its six UIMSM-
based counterparts.  However, this correlation is not as strong as that between UI taxes per
covered employee and the simulation-generated indicators of tax burden.  The relative weakness
of the correlation among indicators of generosity reveals more problems with the simulations than
with the wage replacement ratio.  In particular, unrealistic assumptions embedded in UIMSM
concerning the number of dependents per worker may bias the simulation results.  The simulations
assume that the average worker of each firm has one dependent.12  The ratio of workers to
dependents’ nationwide is probably considerably higher than one.13  Restricting the highest annual
10
million exemptions for dependents.  Of these, 64.6 million were claimed for children living at home.  Thus, most
elderly Americans are independent. Sources:  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics web site (http://stats.bls.gov), U.S.
Bureau of the Census web site (http://census.gov/population/estimates/state/stats/ag9797.txt), and Keenan and
Curry (1995).  
wage to $40,000 for the hypothetical firms raises questions about the representativeness of the
hypothetical firms in states with relatively high wages.
Workers in higher-paying firms, not represented among the hypothetical firms, are most
likely to feel the constraint of maximum benefit limitations and therefore to have low replacement
ratios; Connecticut, Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York are cases in point.
Tax/Benefit Ratios and Interindustry Allocative Neutrality
Simulation results presented in Table 7 suggest that most states’ UI systems tend to be
allocatively neutral.  The variation in ratios across firm types is small for most of the 28 states.  In
19 of these states, the inter-firm standard deviation is less than 0.1, while in more than half of
them it is less than 0.05 (Table 7, column 8).  In those states where such variation is relatively
large, the prototypical construction firm (column 6) enjoys far lower tax/benefit ratios than the
other five cases, indicating a relatively high degree of subsidization.  On average, the
representative financial service provider (column 1) and the representative low-wage
manufacturer (column 2) have somewhat higher tax/benefit ratios than the other representative
manufacturers (columns 3 and 4) and the representative retailer (column 5, bottom line of the
table).
Most states in the sample have a mean tax/benefit ratio for the six prototypes that exceeds
1.0 (column 7).  The high ratios of many states show that their UI tax systems are currently
designed to build up reserves depleted during the recession of the early 1990s.  States with the
highest average ratios also tend to subsidize the representative construction firm most heavily,
suggesting a desire to shield firms suffering the highest incidence of unemployment from the
rigors of aggressive reserve-building efforts.  States with low ratios, such as Georgia and Virginia,
tend to have a high level of reserves in their UI trust funds. 
Adherence to Experience Rating–Measuring Marginal Tax Costs
Most of the tax/benefit ratios displayed in Table 7 exceed the value of 1.0.  However, 115
of the 168 marginal tax costs shown in Table 8 are below 1.0, in many instances far below.  Thus,
while over the long run states may recoup benefits by imposing taxes of equal or greater value,
they generally do not match increases in benefit payments with comparable increases in UI tax
liability.  Evidently, most states keep their UI trust funds solvent largely by imposing high
minimum rates on firms when their employment is stable or expanding.  When firms increase their
propensity to lay off workers, states tend not to increase the firms’ UI tax burdens proportionately
and subject those burdens to a maximum.  Thus, on the whole state UI systems do not effectively
force firms to internalize the social costs generated by unemployment.
11
The widespread subsidization of employers such as the prototypical construction firm
evident in Table 7 results from the firm’s low marginal tax cost in most states.  Under the laws
and regulations of 19 out of the 28 states, the construction firm enjoys a lower marginal tax cost
than the other five firms (Table 8).  In eight of those states, the construction firm’s marginal tax
cost per dollar of UI benefits paid is five cents or less (column 6).  This type of firm tends to be
heavily subsidized because it is at or near most state’s maximum UI tax rate before experiencing
the unemployment shock.  The shock, therefore, has little or no effect on its statutory rate. 
For purposes of comparison, states’ Experience Rating Index (ERI) values for 1997 are
presented in Table 8, column 9.  These values are uncorrelated with the marginal tax costs of any
of the six hypothetical firms.  Given the cyclical influences on ERI discussed in Section 2 of this
paper, the correlations between ERI and marginal tax costs should be stronger after one has
controlled for lagged values of state insured unemployment rates.  In fact, this is not the case. 
Yet, the ranking of many states’ marginal tax cost differs dramatically from their ERI ranking. 
Some states imposing low marginal tax costs had high ERI values, including Virginia, Kentucky,
New York, and Georgia.  In other states, such as North Carolina and Texas, the opposite was
true.
While the authors cannot account for all divergent rankings, some expose a weakness in
the methodology for computing the ERI index—it fails to take into account the extent to which
solvency assessments are experience-rated.  For example, North Carolina, which had the second
lowest ERI in the sample, is one of only five sample states whose solvency assessment is
experience-rated (20 percent of an employer’s basic experience-rated tax rate).  Because this tax
is not part of the state’s “regular” experience-rated tax structure, it is not taken into account in
computing the state’s ERI.  As the result of a similar omission, the marginal tax costs simulated
for Connecticut are between 39 percent and 65 percent above that of the median state (columns 1
through 6), while Connecticut’s 1997 ERI (66) was only 6 percent above the median (62)
(column 9).
2.4 Model Development
UIMSM is a flexible model capable of simulating alternative statutory features and
economic conditions.  The results reported in this paper are based on simulations of a 30-year
experience of hypothetical employers.  The model initializes employers at a steady-state level of
insured unemployment and imputes the UI tax rate which would apply for such an employer in
alternative states.  Employers in these simulations may be regarded as mature rather than as new
“start-up” firms.  
We have recently examined the sensitivity of UIMSM estimates to changing this important
assumption.  In particular, we have examined the implications of setting the firm’s initial UI tax
rate at the state new-employer rate in the first year of the simulation, as opposed to setting it the
rate for a mature firm with a steady prior IUR experience.  For the great majority of states, this
change in assumption did not appreciably alter the main simulation results.  The change does not
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affect marginal tax cost estimates in benefit ratio states at all.  Results change appreciably in only
a handful of reserve ratio states.  The peculiarities of rules in these states will be investigated in
future work.  A full presentation of the sensitivity analysis is given in the Appendix to this paper. 
3.  Conclusion
Let’s pick up where we left off at the end of the introduction.  During a recess in the
negotiations, an anonymous team of economists delivers Section 2 of this paper to both teams of
state business recruiters and to negotiators for the employer.  After discussions resume, the
Massachusetts officials, pointing to column 1 in Table 5, argue that North Carolina’s relative UI
tax burden on financial service firms isn't as low as traditional indicators of statewide UI tax
competitiveness suggest.  While UI tax collections per covered employee in North Carolina are 22
percent of those in Massachusetts (Table 5, column 7), the present value of the prototypical
financial services firm’s UI simulated tax liability in the Tar Heel state is 64 percent of that in
Massachusetts.  The 22 percent figure reflects in large part the mildness of the early 1990s
recession in North Carolina relative to the more severe contemporaneous contraction in the Bay
State.
Moreover, the Massachusetts' delegation notes that, according to the simulation results
reported in Table 6, column 1, North Carolina's UI benefits are not more generous than
Massachusetts for a representative financial services firm.  The present value of the benefits paid
to laid off workers from the firm in North Carolina are 85 percent of the present value of those
which would be paid in Massachusetts.  The North Carolinian's argue that this result reflects the
interaction of North Carolina’s relatively low dependents’ allowance and the simulation’s
unrealistically high assumption that each worker has a dependent.  The Massachusetts team
counters by noting how the simulations expose an especially unattractive feature of North
Carolina’s North Carolina's benefit structure—its low dependents’ allowance.
The team from the Tar Heel state notes that, when located in North Carolina, most
representative firms in the simulations, including the financial services firm, enjoy a lower ratio of
taxes paid to benefits charged than when located in Massachusetts.  Furthermore, they crow about
the uniformity of this ratio across firm types, suggesting very little, if any, cross-industry
subsidization in the state (Table 7).  In Massachusetts, by contrast, there is a relatively wide
dispersion across industries in benefit-tax ratios and an indication that financial service firms
subsidize the UI benefits paid to construction companies and certain manufacturing firms.  Why,
the North Carolinians ask?  Because, as shown by the relative lack of variation across North
Carolina’s representative firms in Table 8, UI experience rating in the Tar Heel state requires
employers to repay benefit charges fairly quickly.  The contingent from the Tar Heel state argues
that the ERI index is biased because it fails to reflect the fact that North Carolina is one of the few
with experience-rated solvency assessments.  The new set of indicators shake up the meeting,
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Figure 1.  The Cyclicality of UI Taxes as a Percent of Total Wages in Covered Employment in the United States
Data from four quarters ending 1949:Q5 through four quarters ending 1999:Q2.
Note: Shaded areas are periods of recession.
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Figure 2. The Cyclicality of the Ratio of UI Benefits to Wage Replacement Ratio in the United States
Data from four
quarters ending 1949: Q4 through four quarters ending 1999:Q2.
Note: Shaded areas are periods of recession.
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Figure 3. The Cyclicality of UI Taxes as a Percent of Total Wages in Covered 
Employment in the New England States
Data from four quarters ending 1949:Q5 through four quarters ending 1999:Q2.
Note: Shaded areas are periods of recession.
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Figure 5.  Simulated Response of UI Taxes of Hypothetical Firms in Connecticut and            




Hypothetical firm’s initial insured unemployment rate (IUR) assumed to equal 1.15 percent, spike in IUR assumed
to equal 2.3 percentage points.  Average annual wages of firm’s employees assumed to equal $28,000.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Unemployment Insurance Micro Simulation Model.
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Table 1.  Two Measures of “UI Tax Competitiveness” by State, 1998 (New England states in bold)
UI Taxes per Covered Worker
State Amount($) Rank Amount (%) Rank
  Alabama 101.69 38 0.4 37
  Alaska 486.56 1 1.3 2
  Arizona 103.89 35 0.3 43
  Arkansas 168.45 20 0.8 11
  California 221.84 13 0.7 18
  Colorado 95.41 41 0.4 37
  Connecticut 388.01 4 0.6 24
  Delaware 165.68 22 0.6 24
  District of Columbia 234.27 11 0.5 29
  Florida 74.19 46 0.2 46
  Georgia 83.72 44 0.1 51
  Hawaii 290.52 8 1.2 3
  Idaho 140.14 27 0.8 11
  Illinois 209.01 15 0.7 18
  Indiana 83.40 45 0.4 37
  Iowa 101.93 37 0.5 29
  Kansas 35.20 52 0.5 29
  Kentucky 159.82 23 0.7 18
  Louisiana 102.66 36 0.5 29
  Maine 231.04 12 1.1 6
  Maryland 140.49 26 0.5 29
  Massachusetts 320.68 7 0.8 11
  Michigan 240.07 10 0.8 11
  Minnesota 153.64 24 0.5 29
  Mississippi 98.06 39 0.6 24
  Missouri 134.53 28 0.3 43
  Montana 168.74 19 0.9 10
  Nebraska 37.18 51 0.2 46
  Nevada 210.67 14 0.8 11
  New Hampshire 47.07 47 0.2 46
  New Jersey 393.49 3 0.8 11
  New Mexico 151.35 25 0.7 18
  New York 196.80 17 0.6 24
  North Carolina 85.57 42 0.3 43
  North Dakota 103.89 34 0.6 24
  Ohio 130.77 29 0.5 29
  Oklahoma 44.28 49 0.2 46
  Oregon 320.74 6 1.2 3
  Pennsylvania 280.11 9 1.0 8
  Rhode Island 431.01 2 1.4 1
  South Carolina 97.21 40 0.4 37
  South Dakota 38.80 50 0.2 46
  Tennessee 112.81 32 0.4 37
  Texas 112.35 33 0.4 37
  Utah 83.82 43 0.5 29
  Vermont 181.36 18 0.8 11
  Virgin Islands 115.59 31 1.1 6
  Virginia 46.33 48 0.1 51
  Washington 337.38 5 1.2 3
  West Virginia 202.11 16 1.0 8
  Wisconsin 166.28 21 0.7 18
  Wyoming 117.84 30 0.7 18
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Services, Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, UI Data Summary, various issues.
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Table 2.  Wage Replacement Ratio by State, 1998
Average Weekly Benefit Amount Average Weekly Benefit Amount
as Percent of Average Weekly Wage as Percent of Average Weekly Wage
in Covered Employment in Covered Employment
STATE VALUE(%) RANK STATE VALUE(%) RANK
  Missouri 29.70 43
  Alabama 29.86 42   Montana 40.79 8
  Alaska 27.71 46   Nebraska 33.75 34
  Arizona 26.64 49   Nevada 35.94 26
  Arkansas 39.98 10   New Hampshire 30.94 39
  California 22.83 51   New Jersey 33.78 33
  Colorado 36.59 22   New Mexico 35.23 29
  Connecticut 27.23 47   New York 26.33 50
  Delaware 30.24 41   North Carolina 38.46 15
  District of Columbia 26.69 48   North Dakota 43.72 3
  Florida 38.39 16   Ohio 37.13 20
  Georgia 30.65 40   Oklahoma 39.90 11
  Hawaii 49.54 1   Oregon 38.22 18
  Idaho 41.45 6   Pennsylvania 39.41 13
  Illinois 34.14 32   Rhode Island 39.60 12
  Indiana 36.16 25   South Carolina 34.93 30
  Iowa 44.43 2   South Dakota 37.66 19
  Kansas 41.95 4   Tennessee 32.14 37
  Kentucky 36.47 24   Texas 34.53 31
  Louisiana 28.96 45   Utah 38.29 17
  Maine 29.66 44   Vermont 35.62 27
  Maryland 32.72 35   Virginia 31.07 38
  Massachusetts 36.87 21   Washington 41.14 7
  Michigan 35.39 28   West Virginia 39.19 14
  Minnesota 41.83 5   Wisconsin 36.59 23
  Mississippi 32.38 36   Wyoming 40.54 9
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Services, UI Data Summary, various issues, and author’s calculations.
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Table 3.  Experience Rating Index by State, 1997 (New England states in bold)
STATE ERI 1997 RANK STATE ERI 1997 RANK
  Alabama 51 36   Nebraska 48 38
  Alaska n.a. n.a.   Nevada 76 5
  Arizona 77 3   New Hampshire 82 2
  Arkansas 61 22   New Jersey 59 24
  California 59 24   New Mexico 63 20
  Colorado 56 27   New York 85 1
  Connecticut 66 15   North Carolina 44 42
  Delaware n.a. n.a.   North Dakota 52 35
  District of Columbia 77 3  Ohio 62 21
  Florida 71 9   Oklahoma 50 37
  Georgia 67 13   Oregon 54 31
  Hawaii 45 41   Pennsylvania 55 28
  Idaho 53 32   Puerto Rico n.a. n.a.
  Illinois 75 6   Rhode Island 66 15
  Indiana 60 23   South Carolina 57 26
  Iowa 64 19   South Dakota 47 40
  Kansas 68 11   Tennessee 65 17
  Kentucky 67 13   Texas 53 32
  Louisiana 70 10   Utah n.a. n.a.
  Maine 55 28   Vermont 48 38
  Maryland n.a. n.a.   Virgin Islands n.a. n.a.
  Massachusetts 55 28   Virginia 74 7
  Michigan n.a. n.a.   Washington a a
  Minnesota 74 7   West Virginia 53 32
  Mississippi 42 44   Wisconsin 65 17
  Missouri 68 11   Wyoming 43 43
n.a.= not available.
a Washington data from 1991 to 1997 are under review.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and authors' calculations.
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Alabama BR 8,000  0.29!5.4 -0.06
Arkansas RR 9,000  0.1!6.0 0.4 
California RR 7,000  0.9!5.4 .10 b
Connecticut BR 13,000  0.5!5.4 1.50 c
Florida BR 7,000  0.0!5.4 VAF + FAFd, e
Georgia RR 8,500  0.02!5.4 none
Illinois BR 9,000  0.2!6.4 0.4 
Indiana RR 7,000  0.2!5.4 none
Iowaf BR 15,700  0.0!7.0 0.1 
Kentucky RR 8,000  0.3!9.0 none
Maryland BR 8,500  0.3!7.5 none
Massachusetts RR 10,800 1.4!7.3 0.76
Michigan g BR 9,500  0.1!8.1 0.2 
Minnesota BR 17,200  0.2!9.1 0.20 b
Mississippi BR 7,000  0.5!5.4 0.5 
Missouri RR 8,500  0.0!6.0 20% of basic tax rate
New Jersey RR 19,300  0.4!5.4 none
New York RR 7,000  0.0!5.4 1.00
North Carolina RR 12,600  0.0!5.7 20% of basic tax rate
Ohio RR 9,000  0.1!6.5 none
Oregonf BR 21,000 1.0!5.4 none
Pennsylvaniag BR 8,000  0.0!7.7 1.50
South Carolina RR 7,000  0.54!5.4 0.06 e
Tennessee RR 7,000  0.0!10.0 none
Texas BR 9,000 0.0!6.0 0.27
Virginia BR 8,000 0.0!5.4 none
Washingtonf BR 22,500  0.48!5.4 0.17
Wisconsin RR 10,500 0.0!8.9 0.05 - 0.85 h
aBR = Benefit Ratio,  RR = Reserve Ratio.
bThe rate additions apply only to positive balance employers in California and Minnesota.
cBesides 1.5 percent Fund Balance Tax, Connecticut has a special bond assessment of 51.3 percent of basic tax
rate.
dVariable Adjustment Factor(VAF) = 0.4526 * (benefit ratio)
  Final Adjustment Factor (FAF) = 0.01 or ( 5.4 - BR - VAF), whichever is smaller.
eThe rate additions cannot increase the maximum experience tax rates in Florida and South Carolina.
fIowa, Oregon and Washington use a Benefit Ratio Ranking System. See the text.
gMichigan and Pennsylvania also include a reserve ratio in computing a portion of the tax rate.
hThe additional tax rate in Wisconsin depends on the employer's basic experience tax rate, and is set by a
schedule.
Sources: Commerce Clearing House (1998) and data from employment security agencies of the individual states.
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Table 5.  Indexes of Present Value of UI Taxes (TAX) for Hypothetical Forms by State, 1998 
                (Massachusetts’ value = 100; New England states on bold)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 2.30% 3.45% Index of UI
IUR Spike  +1.15% +3.45% +3.45% +3.45% +2.30% +4.60% Taxes Per Covered
AAWb  $28,000 $16,000 $28,000 $40,000 $16,000 $40,000 Employeec
STATE TAX RANK TAX RANK TAX RANK TAX RANK TAX RANK TAX RANK INDEX RANK
Alabama 47.0 23 49.6 11 48.6 22 40.0 21 73.3 16 45.5 20 25.9 22
Arkansas 54.4 17 44.9 15 55.1 18 45.7 18 68.0 20 48.2 19 46.4 12
California 54.9 16 27.8 27 55.6 17 39.4 23 46.6 27 44.5 23 65.1 9
Connecticut 155.6 2 123.8 1 157.7 3 155.0 2 156.2 1 139.6 2 106.6 2
   (w/o bond assessment) (106.2) (3) (124.6) (1) (118.8) (3) (124.9) (3) (123.5) (2) (100.0) (2) (106.6) -2
Florida 77.4 9 46.5 12 78.4 9 66.8 11 80.8 10 44.5 23 23.1 26
Georgia 46.0 25 35.6 23 46.6 25 38.4 25 61.1 22 45.4 21 24.7 24
Illinois 95.7 5 62.3 7 97.0 5 82.6 6 100.0 4 72.1 9 58.5 10
Indiana 47.0 23 37.0 21 47.6 24 39.2 24 69.6 17 44.5 23 24.3 25
Iowa 53.7 18 46.5 12 58.2 16 51.8 16 82.0 9 54.3 16 28.6 21
Kentucky 53.5 19 41.6 17 54.2 19 44.9 19 76.8 13 56.1 15 45.0 13
Maryland 74.8 11 55.9 8 75.8 11 62.8 14 91.8 7 69.0 11 40.4 15
Massachusetts 100.0 4 100.0 4 100.0 4 100.0 4 100.0 4 100.0 3 100.0 3
Michigan 61.1 15 41.2 18 61.9 15 54.2 15 68.1 19 60.4 13 70.4 7
Minnesota 78.1 8 50.5 10 79.1 8 77.3 7 80.4 11 89.6 4 44.9 14
Mississippi 39.9 27 35.8 22 40.4 27 33.5 27 59.8 23 38.4 27 25.8 23
Missouri 43.0 26 39.0 19 43.5 26 36.1 26 68.8 18 44.9 22 38.1 16
New Jersey 73.3 13 42.4 16 74.3 13 69.3 10 74.7 15 87.6 5 107.1 1
New York 76.7 10 72.9 6 77.7 10 70.4 9 78.4 12 52.8 17 65.2 8
North Carolina 64.4 14 38.1 20 65.3 14 64.8 12 67.8 21 79.6 6 22.2 27
Ohio 52.2 20 30.6 26 52.9 20 48.3 17 55.4 26 56.8 14 36.7 17
Oregon 157.8 1 108.2 3 166.2 1 136.7 3 127.6 3 75.8 7 86.5 5
Pennsylvania 94.5 6 74.7 5 95.8 6 97.1 5 96.0 6 73.4 8 78.9 6
South Carolina 47.6 22 33.7 24 48.2 23 40.0 21 57.4 25 44.3 26 30.3 20
Tennessee 50.9 21 31.8 25 51.5 21 42.7 20 59.7 23 52.4 18 31.1 19
Texas 85.1 7 54.4 9 86.2 7 71.5 8 87.4 8 66.5 12 32.6 18
Virginia 34.1 28 22.5 28 34.6 28 28.7 28 41.4 28 37.4 28 14.7 28
Washington 149.6 3 116.6 2 164.3 2 171.7 1 143.4 2 150.0 1 93.2 4
Wisconsin 73.9 12 46.0 14 74.9 12 63.8 13 76.5 14 72.1 9 47.0 11
a IUR--Insured Unemployment Rate
b AAW--Average Annual Wage
cAverage for 1997:Q3 through 1998:Q2
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor,  UI Data Summary, October 1998, and authors' calculations using UIMSM. 
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Table 6.  Indexes of Total UI Benefit Paid (BEN) to Employees for Hypothetical Firms by State, 1998
                (Massachusetts’ Value = 100; New England states in bold)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 2.30% 3.45% Wage
IUR Spike +1.15% +3.45% +3.45% +3.45% +2.30% +4.60% Replacement
AAWb $28,000 $16,000 $28,000 $40,000 $16,000 $40,000 Ratio (%)
STATE  BEN RANK  BEN RANK BEN RANK BEN RANK BEN RANK BEN RANK Ratec RANK
Alabama 63.5 27 92.1 11 63.4 27 45.9 27 91.5 11 45.4 27 78.7 24
Arkansas 66.4 26 80.2 21 66.3 26 47.9 26 80.3 21 47.9 26 105.2 5
California 86.0 10 65.0 28 86.0 10 52.7 23 65.1 28 52.7 23 61.4 28
Connecticut 93.5 7 90.5 14 93.5 7 89.8 4 89.8 14 88.9 4 71.8 26
Florida 85.4 14 80.2 21 85.4 14 63.1 15 80.3 21 63.1 15 107.2 4
Georgia 74.8 23 91.6 13 74.8 23 54.1 21 90.9 13 53.5 21 81.7 23
Illinois 98.4 4 93.1 10 98.4 4 71.6 10 93.1 10 71.6 10 90.5 18
Indiana 74.9 22 94.4 9 74.9 22 54.1 21 94.4 9 54.1 21 94.4 13
Iowa 84.8 18 102.5 4 84.0 18 61.2 17 99.4 4 60.6 17 111.9 1
Kentucky 85.5 13 104.8 3 85.4 13 61.8 16 104.1 3 61.2 16 95.4 11
Maryland 83.5 19 96.6 7 83.4 19 60.3 18 95.9 7 59.8 18 88.3 19
Massachusetts 100.0 3 100.0 5 100.0 3 100.0 1 100.0 5 100.0 1 100.0 8
Michigan 95.0 6 95.7 8 95.0 6 72.4 9 95.1 8 71.7 9 92.8 15
Minnesota 85.7 12 80.8 20 85.7 12 76.2 7 80.7 20 76.1 7 108.2 3
Mississippi 57.1 28 80.2 21 57.1 12 41.3 28 80.3 21 41.3 28 84.8 20
Missouri 68.5 25 99.3 6 68.4 25 49.5 25 98.6 6 49.0 25 78.1 25
New Jersey 113.8 1 107.0 2 113.6 1 94.1 3 106.3 2 93.2 3 94.7 12
New York 85.4 14 80.8 19 85.4 14 68.8 12 80.8 19 68.8 12 68.2 27
North Carolina 85.4 14 80.2 21 85.4 14 73.8 8 80.3 21 73.8 8 101.5 7
Ohio 85.1 17 80.2 21 85.1 17 67.5 14 80.3 21 67.5 14 96.5 10
Oregon 106.9 2 107.3 1 106.0 2 77.2 6 104.9 1 77.1 6 99.8 9
Pennsylvania 86.0 10 82.3 18 86.0 10 86.9 5 82.4 18 86.9 5 104.2 6
South Carolina 72.7 24 80.2 21 72.7 24 52.5 24 80.3 21 52.5 24 91.8 17
Tennessee 81.0 20 80.2 21 81.0 20 58.5 19 80.3 21 58.5 19 84.3 21
Texas 93.5 7 88.3 16 93.5 7 67.6 13 87.7 16 66.9 13 92.0 16
Virginia 75.5 21 84.4 17 75.4 21 54.5 20 83.8 17 54.0 20 84.0 22
Washington 97.5 5 92.0 12 96.6 5 96.5 2 89.9 12 96.4 2 111.7 2
Wisconsin 93.5 7 88.3 15 93.5 7 70.0 11 87.7 15 69.3 11 92.9 14
a IUR--Insured Unemployment Rate
b AAW--Average Annual Wage
c Average for 1997:Q3 through 1998:Q2
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor,  UI Data Summary, October 1998, and authors' calculations using UIMSM. 
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Table 7.  Ratio of Present Value of UI Taxes Paid to Present Value of UI Benefits Received (RATIO) for Hypothetical Firms  by State, 1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 2.30% 3.45%
IUR Spike +1.15% +3.45% +3.45% +3.45% +2.30% +4.60% Tax-Benefit Standard
AAWb $28,000 $16,000 $28,000 $40,000 $16,000 $40,000 Ratio Deviation
STATE RATIO RANK RATIO RANK RATIO RANK RATIO RANK RATIO RANK RATIO RANK MEAN RANK VALUE RANK
Alabama 1.18 15 1.24 14 1.14 15 1.14 15 1.14 16 1.13 11 1.16 15 0.042 18
Arkansas 1.33 12 1.36 12 1.25 12 1.25 12 1.21 13 1.11 12 1.25 12 0.089 11
California 1.03 20 1.04 19 0.99 22 1.00 21 1.02 21 1.01 16 1.02 18 0.019 25
Connecticut 3.26 1 2.68 1 2.63 1 2.14 1 2.48 1 1.84 2 2.51 1 0.488 2
Florida 1.46 10 1.45 10 1.37 10 1.37 8 1.44 6 0.84 27 1.32 11 0.239 7
Georgia 1.00 26 0.96 25 0.93 27 0.91 27 0.96 27 0.99 20 0.96 27 0.034 19
Illinois 1.57 6 1.65 7 1.51 5 1.54 4 1.53 5 1.20 5 1.50 6 0.155 8
Indiana 1.03 20 0.97 24 0.95 25 0.93 26 1.05 19 0.98 23 0.99 23 0.046 16
Iowa 1.08 17 1.04 19 1.04 17 1.04 17 1.18 15 1.07 13 1.08 16 0.054 12
Kentucky 1.01 24 0.98 22 0.94 26 0.94 25 1.05 19 1.01 16 0.99 23 0.044 17
Maryland 1.46 10 1.43 11 1.39 9 1.39 7 1.37 11 1.32 3 1.39 10 0.048 14
Massachusetts 1.68 5 2.30 4 1.48 6 1.30 11 1.43 7 1.14 9 1.56 5 0.407 3
Michigan 1.03 20 1.09 17 1.01 19 1.01 19 1.02 21 0.94 25 1.02 18 0.048 14
Minnesota 1.49 7 1.55 8 1.40 8 1.34 9 1.42 8 1.30 4 1.42 7 0.093 10
Mississippi 1.12 16 1.11 16 1.08 16 1.08 16 1.06 17 1.05 14 1.08 16 0.027 21
Missouri 1.01 24 0.98 22 0.98 23 0.98 23 1.00 24 1.00 18 0.99 23 0.013 27
New Jersey 1.04 19 0.95 26 1.00 21 0.99 22 1.00 24 1.04 15 1.00 22 0.034 19
New York 1.47 8 2.08 6 1.36 11 1.32 10 1.38 10 0.92 26 1.42 7 0.375 5
North Carolina 1.21 14 1.18 15 1.19 14 1.19 14 1.21 13 1.19 6 1.20 14 0.012 28
Ohio 0.99 27 0.95 26 0.97 24 0.97 24 0.99 26 0.99 20 0.98 26 0.016 26
Oregon 2.52 3 2.48 3 2.17 3 2.18 3 1.74 3 1.17 8 2.04 3 0.511 1
Pennsylvania 1.81 4 2.15 5 1.65 4 1.45 5 1.66 4 0.96 24 1.61 4 0.396 4
South Carolina 1.05 18 1.05 18 1.01 19 1.01 19 1.02 21 0.99 20 1.02 18 0.024 23
Tennessee 1.02 23 0.99 21 1.02 18 1.02 18 1.06 17 1.00 18 1.02 18 0.024 23
Texas 1.47 8 1.52 9 1.41 7 1.41 6 1.42 8 1.19 6 1.40 9 0.113 9
Virginia 0.73 28 0.66 28 0.70 28 0.70 28 0.71 28 0.73 28 0.71 28 0.026 22
Washington 2.63 2 2.68 1 2.41 2 2.19 2 2.28 2 1.85 1 2.34 2 0.307 6
Wisconsin 1.27 13 1.29 13 1.22 13 1.22 13 1.25 12 1.14 9 1.23 13 0.053 13
MEAN 1.39 1.42 1.29 1.25 1.29 1.11 1.29 0.133
a IUR--Insured Unemployment Rate
b AAW--Average Annual Wage
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor,  UI Data Summary, October 1998, and authors' calculations using UIMSM. 
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Table 8.  Marginal Tax Cost (MTC) of an Additional Benefit Dollar for Hypothetical Firms by State, 1998 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 2.30% 3.45% Mean of Experience
IUR Spike +1.15% +3.45% +3.45% +3.45% +2.30% +4.60% Standard Marginal Rating  
AAWb $28,000 $16,000 $28,000 $40,000 $16,000 $40,000 Deviation Tax Cost Index 1997
STATE MTC ($) RANK MTC ($) RANK MTC ($) RANK MTC ($) RANK MTC ($) RANK MTC ($) RANK VALUE RANK VALUE RANK INDEX RANK
Alabama      1.17 6 0.76 22 0.93 13 0.93 12 0.71 26 0.73 10 0.176 17 0.872 14 51 22
Arkansas 0.94 14 0.94 13 0.89 15 0.89 14 0.89 16 0.85 6 0.035 27 0.900 13 61 13
California 0.83 18 0.67 24 0.81 20 0.81 20 0.83 17 0.04 22 0.312 9 0.664 23 59 15
Connecticut 1.31 2 1.37 2 1.33 2 1.33 1 1.53 2 0.48 16 0.374 6 1.225 2 66 6
  ( w/o bond assessment) (.87) (16) -0.91 (13) (.88) (16) (.88) (16) (1.02) (12) -0.32 (16)C -0.374 (6) (.813) (17) -66 -6
Florida 1.31 2 1.29 3 1.00 8 0.94 11 1.30 4 0.03 26 0.493 3 0.978 10 71 5
Georgia 0.69 25 0.69 23 0.59 27 0.49 27 0.74 24 0.27 17 0.176 17 0.577 27 67 6
Illinois 1.29 4 1.26 4 1.23 3 1.22 2 1.28 5 0.04 22 0.497 2 1.053 3 75 2
Indiana 0.58 27 0.78 21 0.56 28 0.44 28 0.75 22 0.04 22 0.269 11 0.525 28 60 14
Iowa 0.74 23 1.09 7 0.87 18 0.87 17 1.27 6 0.03 26 0.427 5 0.812 17 64 11
Kentucky 0.74 23 0.82 20 0.61 24 0.61 25 1.07 10 0.85 6 0.175 19 0.781 18 67 6
Maryland 1.07 8 1.13 6 1.09 5 1.09 5 1.14 8 0.62 13 0.199 15 1.022 6 n.a. n.a.
Massachusetts 0.46 28 0.25 28 0.61 24 0.81 20 0.79 20 0.60 14 0.210 14 0.587 25 55 18
 (with Schedule B) -0.82 (21) -0.4 -28 -0.81 -20 -0.81 -20 -0.79 -20 -0.41 -16 -0.211 -14.000 (.672) -23 -55 -18
Michigan 0.98 12 1.06 8 0.95 12 0.92 13 1.06 11 0.69 11 0.137 20 0.944 11 n.a. n.a.
Minnesota 0.96 13 1.05 9 0.99 10 1.07 6 0.80 19 1.05 2 0.101 23 0.986 9 74 3
Mississippi 0.99 11 0.89 15 0.89 15 0.89 14 0.93 14 0.64 12 0.120 22 0.871 15 42 24
Missouri 0.80 22 0.83 19 0.82 19 0.82 19 0.83 17 0.90 5 0.034 28 0.833 16 n.a. n.a.
New Jersey 0.83 19 0.60 26 0.81 20 0.86 18 0.78 21 0.76 9 0.093 24 0.772 19 59 15
New York 0.89 16 0.44 27 0.88 17 0.80 22 0.74 24 0.03 26 0.336 8 0.630 24 85 1
North Carolina 1.03 9 0.90 14 1.06 6 1.04 7 1.08 9 0.99 3 0.065 25 1.016 7 44 23
Ohio 0.90 15 0.84 18 0.92 14 0.89 14 0.91 15 0.14 19 0.308 10 0.765 20 62 12
Oregon 0.81 21 0.85 17 0.63 23 0.64 24 0.40 28 0.14 19 0.268 12 0.578 26 54 20
Pennsylvania 1.00 10 1.02 11 0.97 11 0.97 10 1.02 13 0.52 15 0.196 16 0.917 12 55 18
South Carolina 0.86 17 0.95 12 0.79 22 0.79 23 0.75 22 0.21 18 0.262 13 0.724 21 57 17
Tennessee 0.83 18 0.87 16 1.03 7 1.03 8 1.71 1 0.78 8 0.344 7 1.041 4 65 9
Texas 1.20 5 1.15 5 1.17 4 1.17 4 1.19 7 0.04 22 0.464 4 0.986 8 53 21
Virginia 0.64 26 0.64 25 0.60 26 0.60 26 0.66 27 0.94 4 0.129 21 0.681 22 74 3
Washington 2.18 1 1.69 1 1.46 1 1.22 2 1.32 3 0.05 21 0.710 1 1.320 1 d d
Wisconsin 1.08 7 1.05 9 1.00 8 0.98 9 1.06 11 1.06 1 0.039 26 1.039 5 65 9
Mean    0.97 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.98 0.48 0.25 0.86 61.88
n.a.--not available.  
Note:  All rankings assume that Massachusetts uses schedule C unless otherwise noted.
a IUR--Insured Unemployment Rate.
b AAW--Average Annual Wage.
c CT ranks 17 if MA uses schedule B.
d Washington data from 1991 to 1997 are under review.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, unpublished data, and authors' calculations using UIMSM.
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APPENDIX
SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF STATE
NEW-EMPLOYER UI TAX RATES
Most states assign a special “new-employer” UI tax rate to firms during the first few years
of their operation.  These rates are usually the same for all employers in the state, although some
states assign a different new-employer rate to construction firms.  New firms are assigned a fixed
rate because they have no employment history from which UI officials can evaluate their
propensity to lay off workers and, therefore, determine an experience-based tax rate.  The results
reported in the body of this paper do not account for these new-employer tax rates.  It is assumed
in the UIMSM that at the beginning of the 30-year simulation period, each hypothetical employer
is a mature firm; that is, it has already been in operation for several years.  Ten years elapse
between the simulation commencement and the imposition of an exogenous macroeconomic
shock that induces an increase in the firm’s furlough of workers.  
In reality, many firms have operated for less than ten years and properly should be
modeled as new establishments.  In order to simulate the impact of a particular state's UI system
on such employers, one must stipulate the year in which each firm began operations and modify
the model to reflect the UI tax provisions assigned uniquely to new employers.  Simulation results
could be sensitive to the assumption concerning whether the firm is either mature or a new
employer.  This appendix reports on efforts to test this sensitivity.
UIMSM’s Rules for Assigning UI Tax Rates in the Pre-Shock Period
The UIMSM assigns a UI tax rate in the pre-shock period based on the state statutes for
experience rating.  Among the 28 states in our sample, 9 employ the benefit ratio approach, 14 the
reserve ratio approach, 2 (Michigan and Pennsylvania) a hybrid method that combines reserve and
benefit ratio approaches, and 3 (Iowa, Oregon, and Washington) use a reserve ratio ranking
approach.  
As explained in Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang (1999), the three reserve ratio ranking
states use an approach whereby an employer’s reserve ratio relative to those of other employers
determines its tax rate.  For the simulations reported in the text, we assume for these three states
that the economic shock forcing each firm to increase its propensity to lay off workers is unique
to the firm, so that the overall distribution of reserve ratios among firms in the state is unchanged. 
Under this assumption, one can calculate how the shock affects the firm's relative reserve ratio
and, therefore, its UI tax rate.  Alternatively, one could embrace the equally plausible assumption
that the economic shock affects the reserve ratio of all employers proportionally, leaving relative
reserve ratios, and therefore tax rates, unchanged.  Given the impossibility of choosing objectively
between these two alternatives, we elected to exclude these three states and focus our simulation
exercises in this appendix on the other 25 states.
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In UIMSM, the initial reserve ratio for each firm in a reserve ratio state depends on the
ratio of benefits charged to the total taxable wage base:
RR = f (BC/TTWB)
where RR is the firm’s reserve ratio, BC is its cumulative benefit charges, TTWB is the firms total
taxable wage base, and f(@) summarizes the UI provisions of each state.  An initial UI tax rate
(OrigTR) is then determined by this generated RR and the state’s UI tax rate schedule.  Implicitly,
we assume that at the beginning of the simulation period each firm has experienced a fixed insured
unemployment rate (IUR) in several previous years. A similar procedure is used for setting initial
employer UI tax rates in benefit ratio states.  
For new, (as opposed to mature) employers, we assume that the employer initially opens
its doors for business at the beginning of the simulation period.  We assume that the new-
employer tax rate assigned (AssigTR) by each state to businesses in the first few years of their
operation apply (Table A.1).
Differences in Simulated Marginal Tax Costs of an Additional Benefit Dollar
The marginal tax cost MTC is the incremental cost of an added dollar of benefits paid. 
For any year in the simulation it is computed as
MTC = )T/)B = (Ts – Tc)/(Bs – Bc)
where the T represents taxes, B represents UI benefits, and the subscripts s and c refer to values
for the spike and control runs respectively.  The simulation sums the present value of this ratio
over 30 years.  The numerator of this computation is illustrated in Figure 5 in the body of this
paper.  Which is a bar chart of tax contributions.  In this figure, the control and spike tax levels
are constant and equal before the spike in the insured unemployment rate (IUR), which occurs in
period eleven.  That is, a steady state in tax contributions was achieved before the IUR spike was
simulated.  
Changing the tax rate initialization to the state new-employer rate will raise or lower both
the control and spike bars in Figure 5 equally to the new-employer rate for the first one to three
years of the simulation, depending on state law.  From the formula, it is easy to see that these first
years of the simulation add nothing to the MTC.  In the subsequent years before a spike in the
IUR is simulated, the control and spike tax contributions will remain equal and move in tandem;
however, they may not remain constant.  The effect on MTC of changing the initial rate from
OrigTR to AssigTR depends on how tax contributions during these first ten years of the
simulation affect achievement of a steady-state UI tax rate before a spike of IUR is simulated in
period eleven.  If the tax rate in period eleven when the simulation starts at AssigTR differs from
the tax rate in period eleven when starting at OrigTR, then the simulated MTC is likely to be
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different.  Given the complexity of the tax systems, the magnitude and direction of the difference
is difficult to properly predict.    
In benefit ratio states, switching to the new employer rate for initialization of the model
may change the present value of a firm’s total tax contribution, because it may change the tax rate
in the first one, two, or three years.  However, it will not change the MTC of an IUR spike which
occurs in period eleven.  This is because the UI tax rate in benefit ratio states depends only on
benefit charges, which for any simulation are the same for both mature and new firms in any
benefit ratio state.   Therefore, employers will be at the same tax rate by period eleven in benefit
ratio states whether initialized as either new or mature firms.  Since changing the initialization
does not affect the MTC in benefit ratio states, we exclude these states when reporting the
comparative MTCs in Table A.2.
The results under the column heading MTCm in Table A.2 are the same as those reported
in the body of the paper which assume initialization for a mature firm.  Results under the heading
MTCn are from simulations with the tax rate initialized at the state new-employer rate.  In
comparing the MTC estimates from the alternate initializations, it is difficult to generalize about
how a change from OrigTR to AssignTR affects the MTC.  For most of the 14 reserve ratio
states, the MTC estimates barely change, but for Ohio, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, the effect
on MTC is sizeable for all hypothetical firm types.  
In some cases, when AssigTR > OrigTR, MTCn > MTCm (e.g., in Massachusetts for
hypothetical firm types 4, 5, and 6); but in other cases, when AssignTR > OrigTR, MTCn <
MTCm (e.g., in Ohio for hypothetical firms 1 through 5).  The first pattern, which is observed in
Massachusetts, seems reasonable, but what might explain why MTCn is much lower than MTCm
in some cases when AssignTR > OrigTR?  According to the reserve ratio approach, a firm’s
reserve ratio RR equals:
(TAX – BC) / TTWB
where, TAX equals cumulative UI tax payments.  Since by assumption BC is the same in all years
for both new and mature firms, differences between MTCn and MTCm for reserve ratio states are
attributable solely to the differences in UI tax payments. 
If AssigTR < OrigTR, then the new company usually pays less UI tax in the pre-shock
period; that is, TAXn (UI tax on new firms) < TAXm (UI tax on mature firms).  Thus, the same
change in BC will cause a bigger change in RR, which induces a bigger change in the UI tax rate
for new companies.  As a consequence, new companies end up paying more tax for the same IUR
shock, even though their initial UI tax rates are lower.  If AssigTR > OrigTR, the new company
often pays more UI tax in the pre-shock period, which means TAXn > TAXm.  So, the amount of
additional tax that new companies need to pay as a result of the shock is less.   
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However, the results also depend on the width of the tax rate schedule employed by each
state.  When AssigTR < OrigTR, sometimes the firm’s experience rating account (ERA) balance
declines, even before a spike is simulated in year 11, to the point where sometimes the new firm
faces a higher tax rate than OrigTR.  As a result, when the same amount of change in BC occurs,
the new company pays almost the same or even more taxes for a given IUR shock than the mature
firm.  On the other hand, when AssigTR > OrigTR, if the AssigTR raises the ERA enough to push
the firm into a lower tax rate bracket, the amount of tax that new companies pay for the same
IUR shock will be higher.  This partly explains the mixed results for new firms.  
Additional Differences in Results between New and Mature firms
As shown in Tables A.3 and A.4, if a state’s AssigTR >OrigTR, then the present value of
a new firm’s total tax payment generally exceeds the value of a mature firm’s total tax payment. 
Exceptions are Massachusetts, Michigan and Ohio.  With the same exceptions, there is also a
direct relationship between the change in the initial tax rate and the change in the ratio of taxes to
benefit charges.  
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Alabama BR 2.70% 1
Arkansas RR 0.00% 1
California RR 3.40% 1
Connecticut BR 1.00% 1
Florida BR 2.00% 1
Georgia RR 2.70% 1
Illinois BR 3.10% 1
Indiana RR 2.70% 3
Kentucky RR 9.00% 3
Maryland BR 2.30% 1
Massachusetts RR 2.60% 1
Michigan BR 2.7%* 4
Minnesota BR 1.00% 5
Mississippi BR 2.70% 1
Missouri RR 3.24% 1
New Jersey RR 0.50% 1
New York RR 3.70% 1
North Carolina RR 1.20% 1
Ohio RR 2.70% 1
Pennsylvania BR 3.50% 1
South Carolina RR 2.64% 1
Tennessee RR 2.70% 1
Texas BR 2.70% 1.5
Virginia BR 2.50% 1
Wisconsin RR     2.70%** 3
* The initial tax rate is 2.7% for first two years, then the benefit ratio component phases in during the next two
years according to the      formula.
Third year: tax rate = 1/3 * CBC + 1.8%
Fourth year: tax rate = 2/3 * CBC + 1.0%
**There is a solvency charge of 0.9% for the first three years as well.
Sources: Commerce Clearing House (1998).
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Table A.2 Present Value of Marginal Tax Cost (MTC) of an Additional Benefit Dollar Hypothetical "New" Firms vs. "Mature" Firms by
Reserve Ratio State
(1) (2) (3)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15%
IUR Spike +1.15% +3.45% +3.45%
AAWb $28,000  $16,000  $28,000 
State AssigTRc OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($) OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($) OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($)
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 0.94 0.92 1.20% 0.91 0.91 1.60% 0.93 0.92
California 3.40% 2.10% 0.84 0.82 1.00% 0.74 0.64 2.10% 0.82 0.81
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 0.48 0.71 1.16% 0.72 0.67 1.61% 0.42 0.59
Indiana 2.70% 2.00% 0.54 0.72 1.60% 0.76 0.79 2.00% 0.66 0.62
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00% 0.82 0.78 1.50% 0.84 0.83 2.00% 0.67 0.63
Massachusetts 2.60% 1.70% 0.18 0.30 1.40% 0.02 0.29 1.70% 0.50 0.29
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 0.82 0.82 1.32% 0.83 0.83 1.44% 0.82 0.81
New Jersey 0.50% 1.10% 0.85 0.75 0.80% 0.52 0.59 1.10% 0.84 0.82
New York 3.70% 2.20% 0.91 0.89 2.00% 0.03 0.03 2.20% 0.88 0.88
North Carolina 1.20% 1.30% 0.97 1.07 0.70% 0.90 0.86 1.30% 1.03 1.07
Ohio 2.70% 1.60% 0.92 0.01 0.90% 0.85 0.04 1.60% 0.92 0.12
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 0.93 0.83 1.24% 0.82 0.86 1.94% 0.86 0.83
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 0.83 0.68 1.45% 0.86 0.87 2.05% 1.03 1.03














State AssigTRc OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($) OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($) OrigTRd MTCne($) MTCmf($)
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 0.93 0.92 2.40% 0.89 0.96 5.00% 0.92 0.86
California 3.40% 1.70% 0.80 0.81 1.90% 0.82 0.84 5.40% 0.08 0.04
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 0.33 0.49 2.18% 0.58 0.73 4.34% 0.38 0.25
Indiana 2.70% 2.00% 0.63 0.50 4.10% 1.07 0.74 5.40% 0.13 0.04
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00% 0.67 0.63 6.50% 0.44 1.09 6.50% 0.88 0.86
Massachusetts 2.60% 2.30% 0.81 0.26 2.00% 0.80 0.29 6.50% 0.70 0.11
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 0.82 0.81 2.52% 0.82 0.84 4.32% 0.87 0.91
New Jersey 0.50% 1.30% 0.83 0.87 1.60% 0.87 0.83 4.30% 0.85 0.85
New York 3.70% 2.60% 0.86 0.86 2.80% 0.91 0.91 6.40% 0.03 0.03
North Carolina 1.20% 1.50% 1.05 1.04 1.50% 1.00 1.08 4.10% 1.00 1.01
Ohio 2.70% 1.80% 0.94 0.11 1.80% 0.88 0.03 5.30% 0.15 0.27
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 0.86 0.83 2.64% 0.73 0.77 5.09% 0.56 0.12
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 1.03 1.03 2.45% 1.59 1.59 5.50% 0.81 0.75
Wisconsin 2.70% 1.85% 0.52 1.00 1.85% 0.57 1.01 5.70% 0.55 0.86
a IUR---Insured Unemployment Rate.    
bAAW---Average Annual Wage.                                                                                                                                           
cAssigTR---Assigned Tax Rate for "new" firms.
dOrigTR---Original Initial Tax Rate for "mature" firms.
eMTCn --- MTC for "new" firm
fMTCm --- MTC for "mature" firm
Source: Authors' Calculation.
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Table A3.  Present Value of Total UI Tax Payment (TAX), Hypothetical "New Firms vs. "Mature" Firms
                   by State
(1) (2) (3)
Initial IURa 1.15% 1.15% 1.15%
IUR Spike +1.15% +3.45% +3.45%
AAWb $28,000  $16,000  $28,000 
State AssigTRc OrigTRd TAXne($) TAXmf($) OrigTRd TAXne ($) TAXmf($) OrigTRd TAXne($) TAXmf($)
Alabama 2.70% 1.24% 375,477  361,526 1.24% 384,506 370,560 1.24% 393,264.2 79,313
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 396,021 20,487 1.20% 329,627 349,791 1.60% 417,445.3 441,873
California 3.40% 2.10%    492,341  426,129 1.00%  43,617 217,705 2.10% 516,502.2 450,467
Connecticut 1.00% 1.30% 1,208,695 1,218,402 0.80% 976,858 970,419 1.30% 1,252,295.6 1,262,003
Florida 2.00% 2.13% 571,655 596,388 1.21% 372,325 367,828 2.13% 596,662.3 621,395
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 500,913  357,575 1.16% 423,364 280,097 1.61% 511,165.3 371,188
Illinois 3.10% 2.60% 741,292 739,811 1.50% 508,766 91,023 2.60% 782,375.3 780,895
Indiana 2.70% 2.00%    440,218 365,462 1.60% 369,812 291,730 2.00% 459,201.7 380,219
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00%    693,403 414,566 1.50% 629,887 27,131 2.00% 10,843.6 431,000
Maryland 2.30% 2.50%    575,914 580,043 1.80% 450,784 440,472 2.50% 607,618.5 611,747
Massachusetts 2.60% 1.70% 830,364 976,186 1.40% 806,832 891,994 1.70% 853,795.2 985,977
Michigan 2.70% 1.80% 469,007 674,670 1.17% 326,062 525,152 1.80% 500,385.3 699,998
Minnesota 1.00% 1.10% 594,484 607,320 0.70% 440,600 405,112 1.10% 624,314.3 637,150
Mississippi 2.70% 1.40% 320,221 307,553 1.40% 298,156 283,185 1.10% 336,845.2 324,177
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 459,316 331,760 1.32%  45,083 307,705 1.44% 8,798.4 350,771
New Jersey 0.50% 1.10% 422,541 561,942 0.80% 277,679 329,560 1.10% 455,335.1 595,586
New York 3.70% 2.20% 649,235 97,351 2.00% 95,413 58,496 2.20% 675,050.0 623,369
North Carolina 1.20% 1.30% 497,633  498,375 0.70% 348,669 299,817 1.30% 529,482.3 530,358
Ohio 2.70% 1.60% 435,535 487,089 0.90% 306,711 336,718 1.60% 462,838.4 92,310
Pennsylvania 3.50% 3.40% 736,773  735,457 2.60% 586,247 574,406 3.40% 763,364.8 762,049
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 391,257  365,382 1.24% 307,299 263,747 1.94% 412,161.8 386,312
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 423,676 390,994 1.45% 321,790 250,558 2.05% 455,672.8 425,154
Texas 2.70% 2.40% 62,367 657,925 1.40% 450,064 430,843 2.40% 699,748.2 695,306
Virginia 2.50% 1.20% 80,525 263,415 0.75% 199,299 176,275 1.20% 295,917.9 278,808
Wisconsin 2.70% 1.78% 857,042 569,657 0.95% 707,521 362,216 1.85% 874,586.8 600,434
Table A3.  (continued) 32
(4) (5) (6)
Initial  IURa 1.15% 2.30% 3.45%
IUR Spike +3.45% +2.30% +4.60%
AAWb $40,000 $16,000  $40,000 
State AssigTRc OrigTRd TAXne($) TAXmf($) OrigTRd TAXne ($) TAXmf($) OrigTRd TAXne($) TAXmf($)
Alabama 2.70% 1.24% 393,264.2 379,313 2.44% 620,752 622,611 4.14% 991,682 1,016,379 
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 417,445.3 441,873 2.40% 535,625 575,062 5.00% 960,960 1,074,346
California 3.40% 1.70% 467,911.9 385,455 1.90% 470,777 394,102 5.40% 886,964 1,025,547 
Connecticut 1.00% 1.70% 1,469,715.5 1,492,367 1.50% 1,311,349 1,327,493 4.90% 3,051,093 3,179,793
Florida 2.00% 2.18% 611,105.0 638,086 2.42% 645,103 679,163 5.40% 947,587 1,025,547
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 527,057.7 367,228 2.18% 560,570 517,855 4.34% 754,306 1,035,474
Illinois 3.10% 2.70% 804,830.2 804,830 3.00% 838,937 843,411 6.40% 1,604,540 1,660,409
Indiana 2.70% 2.00% 481,066.5  378,653 4.10% 576,810 583,164 5.40% 766,495 1,025,547
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00% 710,843.6 431,000 6.50% 841,906 640,294 6.50% 1,360,773 1,235,632
Maryland 2.30% 2.50% 607,618.5 611,747 3.30% 753,125 773,934 6.60% 1,465,388 1,555,911
Massachusetts 2.60% 2.30% 993,881.5 1,142,227 2.00% 897,183 1,067,629 6.50% 1,961,962 2,224,689 
Michigan 2.70% 1.89% 525,257.1 725,653 2.16% 567,343 773,444 5.04% 1,343,990 1,538,704
Minnesota 1.00% 1.30% 706,297.2 744,888 1.40% 637,427 684,672 3.90% 1,607,708 1,988,144
Mississippi 2.70% 1.10% 336,845.2 324,177 2.40% 504,981 503,818 3.90%  839,952 859,917
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 478,798.4 350,771 2.52% 651,010 578,823 4.32% 983,017   93,854
New Jersey 0.50% 1.30% 512,370.7 674,557 1.60% 470,834 630,269 4.30% 1,426,945 1,939,815
New York 3.70% 2.60% 717,994.6 678,401 2.80% 706,632 669,315 6.40% 1,172,382 1,227,207
North Carolina 1.20% 1.50% 618,284.1 632,300 1.50% 556,227 569,383 4.10% 1,525,085 1,766,983
Ohio 2.70% 1.80% 500,859.8 530,721 1.80% 489,315 545,354 5.30% 958,411 1,318,827
Pennsylvania 3.50% 4.10% 917,406.2 925,303 3.70% 805,860 808,516 5.80% 1,612,254 1,663,084
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 412,161.8 386,312 2.64% 490,250 483,603 5.09% 742,486 1,010,307
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 455,672.8 425,154 2.45%    491,212 486,920 5.50% 1,119,513 1,163,968
Texas 2.70% 2.40% 699,748.2 695,306 2.70% 736,813 736,813 6.00% 1,481,166 1,530,995
Virginia 2.50% 1.20% 295,917.9 278,808 1.57% 360,585 348,233 3.52% 799,075 812,765
Wisconsin 2.70% 1.85% 890,063.1 620,467 1.85% 916,900 643,558 5.70% 1,569,961 1,581,526
a IUR!Insured Unemployment Rate.
bAAW!Average Annual Wage.
cAssigTR!Assigned Tax Rate for “new” firms.
dOrigTR!Original Initial Tax Rate for “mature” firms.
eTAXn ! TAX for “new” firms.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A4.   Ratio of Present Value of UI Taxes Paid to Present Value of UI Benefits Received                    
















State AssigTRc OrigTRd RATIOne RATIOmf OrigTRd RATIOne RATIOmf OrigTRd RATIOne RATIOmf
Alabama 2.70% 1.24% 1.23 1.18 1.24% 1.33 1.29 1.24% 1.20 1.16
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 1.24 1.32 1.20% 1.31 1.39 1.60% 1.22 1.29
California 3.40% 2.10% 1.19 1.03 1.00% 1.69 1.07 2.10% 1.16 1.01
Connecticut 1.00% 1.30% 2.68 2.70 0.80% 3.45 3.43 1.30% 2.59 2.61
Florida 2.00% 2.13% 1.39 1.45 1.21% 1.48 1.47 2.13% 1.35 1.41
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 1.39 0.99 1.16% 1.48 0.98 1.61% 1.32 0.96
Illinois 3.10% 2.60% 1.56 1.56 1.50% 1.75 1.69 2.60% 1.54 1.54
Indiana 2.70% 2.00% 1.22 1.01 1.60% 1.25 0.99 2.00% 1.19 0.98
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00% 1.68 1.01 1.50% 1.92 1.00 2.00% 1.61 0.98
Maryland 2.30% 2.50% 1.43 1.44 1.80% 1.49 1.46 2.50% 1.41 1.42
Massachusetts 2.60% 1.70% 1.72 2.03 1.40% 2.58 2.85 1.70% 1.65 1.91
Michigan 2.70% 1.80% 1.02 1.47 1.17% 1.09 1.75 1.80% 1.02 1.43
Minnesota 1.00% 1.10% 1.44 1.47 0.70% 1.74 1.60 1.10% 1.41 1.44
Mississippi 2.70% 1.40% 1.16 1.12 1.40% 1.19 1.13 1.10% 1.14 1.10
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 1.39 1.01 1.32% 1.43 0.99 1.44% 1.35 0.99
New Jersey 0.50% 1.10% 0.77 1.03 0.80% 0.83 0.98 1.10% 0.78 1.01
New York 3.70% 2.20% 1.58 1.45 2.00% 2.36 2.21 2.20% 1.53 1.41
North Carolina 1.20% 1.30% 1.21 1.21 0.70% 1.39 1.20 1.30% 1.20 1.20
Ohio 2.70% 1.60% 1.06 1.19 0.90% 1.22 1.34 1.60% 1.05 1.12
Pennsylvania 3.50% 3.40% 1.78 1.78 2.60% 2.28 2.23 3.40% 1.72 1.71
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 1.12 1.04 1.24% 1.22 1.05 1.94% 1.10 1.03
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 1.09 1.00 1.45% 1.28 1.00 2.05% 1.09 1.02
Texas 2.70% 2.40% 1.47 1.46 1.40% 1.63 1.56 2.40% 1.45 1.44
Virginia 2.50% 1.20% 0.77 0.72 0.75% 0.76 0.67 1.20% 0.76 0.72
Wisconsin 2.70% 1.78% 1.90 1.26 0.95% 2.56 1.31 1.85% 1.81 1.24
















State AssigTRc OrigTRd RATIOne RATIOmf OrigTR RATIOne RATIOm OrigTRd RATIOne RATIOm
Alabama 2.70% 1.24% 1.20 1.16 2.44% 1.16 1.16 4.14% 1.08 1.11
Arkansas 0.00% 1.60% 1.22 1.29 2.40% 1.14 1.22 5.00% 0.99 1.11
California 3.40% 1.70% 1.24 1.02 1.90% 1.23 1.03 5.40% 0.83 0.96
Connecticut 1.00% 1.70% 2.29 2.32 1.50% 2.48 2.52 4.90% 1.70 1.77
Florida 2.00% 2.18% 1.36 1.42 2.42% 1.37 1.44 5.40% 0.74 0.80
Georgia 2.70% 1.61% 1.36 0.95 2.18% 1.05 0.97 4.34% 0.70 0.96
Illinois 3.10% 2.70% 1.57 1.57 3.00% 1.53 1.54 6.40% 1.11 1.15
Indiana 2.70% 2.00% 1.24 0.98 4.10% 1.04 1.05 5.40% 0.70 0.94
Kentucky 9.00% 2.00% 1.61 0.98 6.50% 1.38 1.05 6.50% 1.10 1.00
Maryland 2.30% 2.50% 1.41 1.42 3.30% 1.34 1.37 6.60% 1.21 1.29
Massachusetts 2.60% 2.30% 1.39 1.60 2.00% 1.53 1.82 6.50% 0.97 1.10
Michigan 2.70% 1.89% 1.01 1.40 2.16% 1.02 1.39 5.04% 0.93 1.06
Minnesota 1.00% 1.30% 1.30 1.37 1.40% 1.34 1.44 3.90% 1.04 1.29
Mississippi 2.70% 1.10% 1.14 1.10 2.40% 1.07 1.07 3.90% 1.01 1.03
Missouri 3.24% 1.44% 1.35 0.99 2.52% 1.12 1.00 4.32% 0.99 1.00
New Jersey 0.50% 1.30% 0.76 1.00 1.60% 0.75 1.01 4.30% 0.76 1.03
New York 3.70% 2.60% 1.46 1.38 2.80% 1.49 1.41 6.40% 0.84 0.88
North Carolina 1.20% 1.50% 1.17 1.20 1.50% 1.18 1.21 4.10% 1.02 1.18
Ohio 2.70% 1.80% 1.04 1.10 1.80% 1.04 1.16 5.30% 0.70 0.97
Pennsylvania 3.50% 4.10% 1.48 1.49 3.70% 1.67 1.67 5.80% 0.92 0.95
South Carolina 2.64% 1.94% 1.10 1.03 2.64% 1.04 1.03 5.09% 0.70 0.95
Tennessee 2.70% 2.05% 1.09 1.02 2.45% 1.04 1.03 5.50% 0.95 0.98
Texas 2.70% 2.40% 1.45 1.44 2.70% 1.43 1.43 6.00% 1.09 1.13
Virginia 2.50% 1.20% 0.76 0.72 1.57% 0.73 0.71 3.52% 0.73 0.74
Wisconsin 2.70% 1.85% 1.78 1.24 1.85% 1.78 1.25 5.70% 1.12 1.13
a IUR!Insured Unemployment Rate.
bAAW!Average Annual Wage.
cAssigTR!Assigned Tax Rate for “new” firms.
dOrigTR!Original Initial Tax Rate for “mature” firms.
eRATIOn!RATIO for “new” firms.
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